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Our assessment on the risks of local banks is based
on six criteria- ownership, management, loan portfolio,
liquidity, capital adequacy and profitability. The last
three of them are analyzed in the light of financial data
and applied to the whole of our population because these
data can be obtained easily. After detailed analysis of
their financial ratios, we pick out five that are
comparatively poor in their financial position for further
analysis- Dao Heng Bank, Far East Bank, Ka Wah Bank, Union
Bank of Hong Kong and Wing On Bank.
We consider our second stage of analysis, which is
based on the first three criteria, more important.
However, due to our limited resources and the fact that the
information is not readily available, we can only work on
the five banks selected in the first stage of analysis.
Interviews were conducted to collect relevant information
and opinion on their viability. It is noticed that some of
them have already had capital injections from strong
parties while others are still seeking for new support.
Despite keen competition from the Hongkong Bank and
the Bank of China group, we conclude that smaller local
banks are going to survive in the industry provided that
they have a competent management team and make appropriate
adjustment during the next two years. A general manager of
a medium-sized local bank stated, There is still room for
us in the industry just as you can still find supermarket
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PREFACE
After the failures of Hang Lung Bank (1983) and
Overseas Trust Bank (1985), public confidence began to
shift to larger banks. As a result, problems in several
small local banks were brought to surface. Meanwhile, the
Hongkong Government also realized that supervision on loca:
financial institutions was inadequate and had proposed som(
legislative changes in order to strengthen its surveillancE
on the local banking industry. Besides the adjustments
required to comply with the new Banking Act, small banks
have to face keen competition and unfavorable economic
conditions in the marketplace. Therefore, the year 1986
will certainly be a difficult and crucial year for these
small banks.
In this report, we are aiming at understanding the
market structure of local banking industry and
investigating the viability of several banks, which we
found them perform badly in the past couple of years, under
the newly developed market situations and legal
requirements.
We define a bank to be problematic basing on both
quantitative and qualitative data. Figures can be easily
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obtained from published financial statements. However,
qualitative information are seldom published. Our main
source of this type of information are newspaper clippings,
periodicals and interviews. Under this circumstance,
subjective opinions are inevitable, but we have tried our
best to keep an objective viewpoint. In our interviews
with experienced bankers and informal talks with friends in
the banking industry, we have not only obtained insiders'
information, but we have also tested the validity of our
data from other sources.
When we were preparing this report, we, the writers,
had frequently discussed and shared our ideas. In order to
give a feel of consistency to readers, we divided our
writings into two parts: Lee Wai-sum wrote the first four
chapters and Chow Lap-fai did the rest.
Through this report, we hope to provide an analytical
framework for depositors, investors and those who are
interested in the local banking industry, to assess the
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1.1 Scope and Purpose
Our interest in the topic is triggered by the
problems faced by a number of local financial institutions
over the past couple of years. In the research, we are
going to examine the local commercial banks in Hongkong
and, in particular, identify those factors which are
considered important in determining their riskiness.
Also, we shall examine the existing and proposed regulatory
and supervisory controls for commercial banks. Through the
data collected and subsequent analysis, we would give
suggestion to banks' depositors, customers and other
related parties on the more risky banks' assessment, and
conclude if the existing and proposed regulatory controls
are adequate to prevent future Hang Lung and Overseas Trust
Bank type of crises from occurring.
1.2 The Hongkong Banking System
The local banking industry comprises i' 11LC11oCu
banks (106 incorporated outside Hongkong), 33 licensed
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deposit-taking companies (DTCs) and 301 registered DTCs (of
which 201 are subsidiaries or associates of banks).
The business of banking in Hongkong is governed by
the Banking and Deposit-Taking Companies ordinances, which
essentially divides financial institutions into three
categories:
Table 1
oolnpari5on o uit erent rinancial institutions in HK
Licensed Licensed Registered
Banks DTCs DTCs
Min. Issued Capital HK$100 mil HK$100 mil HK$10 mil
Min. Paid-up Capital HK$100 mil HK$75 mil HK$10 mil
Minimum Deposit Size Nil HK$500,000 HK$100,000
Minimum Maturity Nil Nil 3 months
Operation of Checking Yes NoNo
Facilities
Under this three-tier approach, licenced banks have a
monopoly on checking accounts and on all deposits of less
than HK$100,000. DTCs, however, have restrictions on their
deposit size and registered DTCs even have restrictions on
minimum maturity. DTCs, unlike banks, are free to set
their own interest rates on deposits, but licensed banks
must adhere to the interest rates agreed by the Hongkong
Association of Banks, of which each licensed bank is a
member.
Hongkong has no central bank or official lender of
last resort, although in the past this role has been
performed by the two note-issuing banks, that is, the
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Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Standard
Chartered Bank, and the Bank of China.
1.3 Supervision and Control
Responsibility for administering the two Ordinances
rests with the Commissioner of Banking (who is also the
Commissioner of Deposit-Taking Companies). The
requirements imposed by the legislation fall into three
main areas.
1.3.1 Reporting Requirements
All licensed banks, registered DTCs and licensed DTCs*
are required to submit weekly, monthly and quarterly
returns to the Office of the Commissioner of Banking and
Deposit-Taking Companies. The reporting requirements are
the same for foreign and locally incorporated banks.
1.3.2 Financial Ratios
Under the provisions of the two Ordinances, financial
institutions are required to comply with certain financial
parameters, including limitations on loans to any one
individual or institution (25 percent of shareholders'
funds), and unsecured lending to directors and employees.
There are also restrictions on dividend payments, if
shareholders' funds fall below a certain level.
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In addition, banks are required to keep 25 percent of
their deposit liabilities falling due that month in the
form of specified liquid assets. Deposit liabilities are
defined as gross demand, time and savings account
liabilities. Deposits in Hongkong with maturity more than
seven days are not subject to liquidity requirement whilst
deposit with maturity less than seven days attract a 100
percent liquidity requirement.
1.3.3 Examination of Books/Discretionary Powers
Under the Ordinance, the Commissioner has the
authority to send in examination teams to audit any
institution's books. In practice, this is normally carried
out annually for local banks but less frequently for
foreign banks. Besides these regular visits, the
Commissioner has full power to examine a bank's books at
will or institute an investigation if he has any cause for
concern over its management or portfolio. Subsequent to
such an investigation he may require the bank to take
whatever action he considers necessary, including
assumption of control of the bank, as was the case for Hang
Lung Bank and more recently Overseas Trust Bank.
1.3.4 Proposed Legislative Changes
Following the Government takeover of the Hang Lung
Bank and the collapse of a number of DTCs in 1982/83 and
supported by a recognition that the existing statutory
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framework has not kept abreast-with the rapid pace of
development of the local banking industry, a team from the
Bank of England was appointed to review Hongkong's
supervisory controls of banks and DTCs.
Detailed proposals are still under discussion but
revolve around the premise that the Commissioner should
operate. on a more discretionary basis, relying more heavily
on his judgements about the capacity of management in each
bank. The legislation would provide not only minimum
requirements of capital adequacy ratio and liquidity ratio,
but would also stipulate a range, within which the
Commissioner would specify the precise ratios to be
complied with by the particular institution, having regard
to the quality of management and loan portfolio. The major
areas for proposed change are as follows:
1) Improved Reporting Requirements
Introduction of a new monthly return, with details on
profitability, contingent liabilities and new large item'
loans.
2) Introduction of Capital Adequacy Ratio
Imposition of minimum capital adequacy ratio of 5
percent, for all banks and DTCs. According to Mr. R.
Farrant, advisor to the Banking Commissioner and seconded
from the Bank of England,.it is anticipated that the
majority of banks would be required to maintain a ratio
between 5-8 percent.
63) Liquidity
It is proposed that all deposits from and claims on
foreign banks with maturity less than one month should be
netted for liquidity ratio requirements. If a net interbank
liability remains, it should be subject to the normal 25
percent liquidity requirement. If a net interbank claim
results, it would be treated as a liquid asset.
1.4 Type of Risks in Banks
There are six generic risks in commercial banking.
These are:
1) credit risks - arising from externally, or internally,
caused deterioration in the quality of
earning assets
2) investment risks - losses in the principal values of
bank investments, primarily the
securities portfolio and fixed
assets
3) liquidity risks - losses arising from financial
mismatches in the tenor of assets and
liabilities and from liquidifying
assets or switching liabilities in
adverse market conditions to meet
liquidity claims;
4) operating risks - losses arising from operating errors,
inefficiencies, and other
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contingencies which are uninsured and
chargeable to earnings and capital
funds;
5) fraud risks - losses arising from the malfeasance or
dishonesty of staff and customers as
these risks are not insured, contingent
claims on earnings and capital are
involved;
6) fiduciary risks - losses arising from the improper
discharge of fudiciary
responsibilities.
A different type of risk, which can be of enormous
magnitude, is related to foreign exchange transactions.
There are many technical reasons for risks from foreign
exchange, the major being that most transactions with
clients are too small for banks to cover in the market
immediately. Lack of clear foreign exchange policy, lack
of efficient internal control and incompetence of the top
management, and often a pure speculation are the prime
reasons for foreign exchange losses. The major losses may
be undetected for a long period of time since incompetence
of management is coupled with the incompetence of





We divide the commercial banks in Hongkong into three
categories:
1) Local banks - defined as commercial banks incorporated
in Hongkong excluding the state-controlled
banks defined below and those whose major
operation is that of DTCs
2) State-controlled banks - defined as commercial banks in
Hongkong with PRC capital
3) Foreign banks - defined as foreign incorporated banks in
Hongkong.
Our population of banks would consist of the first
category. Out of the 143 commercial banks in Hongkong, 35
of them are incorporated in Hongkong. Four of them are
excluded due to their state-controlled properties and
another four are excluded because of their DTC's nature.
Thus, the number of elements in the population is 27.
(Appendix 1)
92.2 Variables
In order to evaluate the risk for the banks in our
population, the following key factors are identified:
1) Ownership - the names and shares of the owners, what
percentage of shares is held publicly;
2) Management - the key persons in the top management,
their qualification, competence and
experience in the banking industry, their
relationship with the owners;
3) Loan portfolio - changes in loan volume, structure and
type of loans, exposure by industry,
loss reserve adequacy and loss
experience;
4) Liquidity - the ability to satisfy the demand for loan
and the coverage of deposit account
withdrawal;
5) Capital adequacy - the adequacy of the capital base in
relation to the amount of loans,
deposits and borrowed funds, as
cushion for probable losses;
6) Profitability - net income and its changes, return on
assets and return on equity ratios.
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2.3 Data Collection Methods
Data are collected mainly from published financial
statements. As the law does not require banks to reveal to
the public their domestic and foreign operations
separately, the analysis refers to banks' overall
activities in Hongkong and elsewhere. However, it may be
worth noting that as of September 1984 only 12 banks (out
of the 27) have set up branches abroad. Apart from the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the relative
importance of overseas operations is quite small for local
banks. A list of these banks and the number of their
overseas branches is given in Appendix II.
Although the accounting period for all local banks is
a calender year, the following banks have closing dates
other than December 31 for their annual accounts:
Table 2
Banks with Their Closing Dates for Annual Accounts
ether Than December 31
March 31Hang Lung Bank, Limited
March 31Dao Heng Bank Limited
June 30HK Industrial Commercial Bank Limited
June 30The Hong Kong Chinese Bank Limited
June 30Overseas Trust Bank Limited
The statements of these banks are treated as if their
closing dates were at year end that year or the recent year
depending on the availability of data.
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Additional secondary data are collected from existing
study on local banking industry, periodicals and journals.
These include the study of local banks performance, the
Bankers' Data Base, magazines and paper clippings. These
additional information is important as many of the
variables of interest are not shown in the published
financial statements.
At the last stage of the research, we interview
people in the banking industry for information which is
absolutely not available from secondary data source. Also,
opinions on the major issues raised in the research are
collected from these people.
2.4 Definition of Terms
Terms used in the reseach are mainly the usual terms
appeared in the published financial statements, our major
source of data. Suitability of the terms used is discusse(
in the analysis section. The more important terms are
defined as follows:
1) "Cash and bank balances" includes cash on hand, cash at
call and short notice, and balances with other
banks/institutions as shown in the published financial
statements. Also included under this heading are time
deposits/Certificate of Deposits except for two banks-
Far East Bank and Shanghai Commercial Bank - which did
not publish separate figures for these items.
122) "Government securities" includes government treasury
bills and guarantee note.
3) "Liquid assets" includes "cash and bank balances and
"government securities" but excludes "amount due from
related companies". It should, however, be noted that
certain banks keep their surplus funds with their
overseas affiliates/subsidiaries.
4) "Other investments" includes investments in properties,
shares and bonds (quoted and unquoted), gold and silver
on hand.
5) Loans include bills receivable, advances to customers
and other accounts, including due to related
companies but excluding "total investments".
6) "Total investments" includes "investments in related
companies","govenment securities" and "othere
investments" as defined.
7)"Due to/from related companies" includes amounts due
to/from holdings, subsidiaries and associated
companies.
8) "Deposits" refers to availble data on deposit accounts
of local banks as shown in the published financial
statements, which include demand, time, savings and
other deposits of customers. Also included in deposit
accounts of the local banks are inner reserves,
provisions for taxation, and in certain cases sundry
creditors and accrued expenses, which were not
disclosed separately in the financial statements of the
banks.
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9) "Borrowed funds" refers to deposits from bankers and
agents.
10) "Capital funds" includes paid-in capital, retained
earnings and different kinds of reserves shown in the
published financial statements.
11) "Net profit" refers to profits (losses) after
provisions for taxes, directors' and auditors' fee,




The primary stage of analysis uses mainly numerical
data. Variables 4, 5 and 6 shown in Section 2.2, that is,
liquidity, capital adequacy and profitability, are
discussed first since they are more easily assessed by
using the available information from the published
financial statements.
The following gives the numerical ratios or rates
used in assessing the three variables and their formulae:
1) Liquidity- i) loans to deposits and borrowed funds
Loans
100%
Deposits and Borrowed Fund:




Deposits and tsorrowed Funds
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Li) deposits and borrowed funds to
capital funds
Deposits and Borrowed Funds
Capital Funds








These ratios are calculated for all the banks in the
population for 1983 and 1984. The results are then
compared amongst all the local banks. Banks considered
more risky are picked for stage two analysis.
2.5.2 Stage Two
Banks picked up in the stage one analysis are
analyzed in more detail at this stage. All the six
variables identified in section 2.2 are discussed, with
particular attention paid to the first three, that is,
ownership, management and loan portfolio. Since such data
are more difficult to get and assess objectively, data
sources other than the published financial statements like
existing studies, journals and experienced bankers' ideas
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are used for analysis. Important points for future
viability of these few banks are also discussed.
2.5.3 Stage Three
Outlook of the whole population of the 27 commercial
banks with local capital in Hong Kong is analysed in this
stage. They are categorized in different groups according
to their different ownership and business nature. Keen
competition that these banks are facing is also discussed.
The existing and proposed regulatory and supervisory
controls for local banks are then examined to evaluate






Financial data are collected mainly through published
financial statements. Since only eight of the banks are
listed in the stock market, the other 19 are not required
to disclose their financial results to the public. Other
sources are thus sought, including those from the banks'
public relations department directly, and those from the
Study on Local Banks Performance 1983 done by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Since most of the banks'
financial statements for 1985 are not ready, the 1984
statements are used instead. For the five banks whose
statement dates are not at year end, the latest possible
financial statemnts are used.
Except for Tai Yau Bank and Tai Sang Bank, all the
other 25 banks' financial statements are collected for
analysis. In the next chapter, it is explained that these
two banks' business is remarkably different from the others
and they are excluded from the ratio analysis.
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3.2 Qualitative Data
Some qualitative data can be seen from their
published annual reports. These include some basic
information on the banks' board of directors, management
and their principal activities. This information, however,
is only limited and other sources are sought. Three
interviews are conducted with experienced people in the
banking field. They are:
1) Miss Margaret Yao - Assistant Vice President of the
First National Bank of Chicago
(FNBC) Hongkong Branch. She works
in the International Financial
Institutions Group which deals with
the banks and DTC's in Hongkong.
Since FNBC has credit lines with
most of the local banks in Hongkong,
Miss Margaret Yao keeps good
relation with senior managers of the
local banks and is well informed of
the recent changes in the industry.
2) Mr. Jackson Chan - Branch Manager of the Kowloon City
Branch of Far East Bank. Working at
the retail level of a local bank in
Hongkong, he is familiar with the
local banks' competition and their
ways of doing business. His long
18
time services in Far East Bank has
also made him expert in the banking
field. He is in an excellent
position to comment on the degree
local banks' retail deposits are
affected by the recent cases of
banks' failure and their future,
viability.
3) The third person in our interview list works at a top
management level in a medium-sized local bank.
Unfortunately, due to the sensitive issue of the topic
of our interview, he strongly refused to let his name
disclosed. Much of our analysis on the qualitative side
and on the future viability of local banks is based on





In this first stage of analysis, a number of local
banks are picked for further analysis because of their
comparatively weaker financial ratios. In order to justify
such method of screening, a bank failure case is
investigated to see if financial ratios can reflect the
riskiness of a bank.
The case of Overseas Trust Bank (OTB) is used as it
is the most recent one so that financial information is
easier to collect. The following is a summary of the
financial ratios used in stage one analysis of overseas
Trust Bank for 1983 and 1984, the industry average ratios
(using the average of four banks- Hang Seng Bank, Overseas
Trust Bank, Shanghai Commercial Bank and Bank of East Asia
- which are of comparable size with OTB) for 1984:
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Table 3
Summary of OTB's Financial Ratios for 1983 & 1984




Liquid Assets to Deposits 20.3% 25.1% 54.3%
Borrowed Funds
Loans to Dep. Borrowed Funds 78.4% 48.3%
Capital Funds to Loans 31.0% 19.2%




Return on Equity 6.2% 3.5% 16.4%
Return on Assets 1.2% 0.4% 1.1%
It can be noticed that capital adequacy and
profitability ratios of Overseas Trust Bank in general
deteriorated over the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984.
When compared with the industry average of the four banks,
the financial ratios of OTB are weaker for five out of the
six ratios. Also, in the four ratios for assessing the
liquidity and profitability, OTB is very much worse than
the average of the four banks.
From this case, we can see that financial ratios
reflect at least a part of the banks' performance and we
should have confidence in our financial analysis which
select a few more risky banks for further analysis.
4.2 Problems with Financial Analysis
Although financial analysis is sometimes a reliable
indicator of a bank's risk condition, it can also give rise




qualitative anaylsis, which is a more reliable way in
assessing a bank's risk, after the financial comparison.
However, due to the difficulty in collecting qualitative
data and the impossibility of interviewing every bank,
financial analysis still plays an important role in
reducing the 27 banks to a manageable number of banks which
are more risky than the others for further qualitative
analysis. When doing the financial analysis, the following
problems should be fully borne in mind:
1) Weaker financial ratios do not necessarily mean that the
bank is more risky. Different banks may have different
business directions and types of customers, resulting in
a large difference in their corresponding ratios. For
example, a bank may have a high quality loan portfolio
that it may choose to keep a lower liquidity ratio than
another bank whose loans are not so secured.
2) The financial data of the banks are not all for the same
period of time. In some cases, significant difference
may be due to different closing dates of their financial
statements and in others, due to the fact that some
financial statements are not available. Comparison
between them is therefore not exactly cross-sectional
analysis.
3) The data in the financial statements are grouped in such
a way that detail study of the financials is not
possible. For example, the term deposits and other
22
funds include all sort of customers' deposits, fixed and
demand, interbank deposits and inner reserves. Also, a
formal income statement is lacking in the financial
statements which disclose only bottomline figures like
profit after tax and profit before tax.
4) Numbers in the financial statements may be manipulated
by the banks' management. Since the balance sheet is
only a snapshot of the bank's financial situation at one
point in time, management may try to improve the ratios
just before balance sheet date, although they are not as
healthy in the rest of the year. Misconduct of the
management may also result in better financial position
than the actual case.
In the following section of preliminary financial
analysis, some problems mentioned above are tackled before
the actual analysis.
4.3 Preliminary Analysis
Financial data from the financial statements for 1983
and 1984 collected are grouped together and put in a lotus
worksheet (Appendix 3 and 5). Ratios are automatically
generated from the software (Appendix 4 and 6).
By looking at the figures casually, the following
points are noted:
1) The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Hongkong
Bank) is much bigger than the other 26 local banks. Its
23asset size is more than eight times that of Hang Seng
Bank, the second largest local bank in Hongkong.
Actually, its assets and deposits are more than the
total assets and the total deposits of the other 26
local banks combined. Moreover, Hongkong Bank has 139
overseas branches as of September 1984 (Appendix 2),
much more than the other local banks which have overseas
branches. It can be said that the Hongkong Bank is more
an international bank than a local bank. Therefore,
comparing its financial ratios with those of the other
local banks is not so meaningful. In the following
analysis, which is basically a comparison of the banks'
ratios, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation is
excluded. Besides, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation is also the banker of the Hongkong
Government. In the past cases of local banks' failures,
it also acted as the lender of last resort under the
direction of the Hongkong Government. Its special
relationship with the Government gives the general
public much confidence in the bank so that it has
captured a major market share of the deposits in
Hongkong. Although the financial ratios of Hongkong
Bank are in general worse than the average, given these
favourable factors, we see no substantial risk elements
associated with it. This is the bank that customers of
a failing local banks will turn to is the comment on
Hongkong Bank given to us by the experienced bankers we.
have interviewed. Therefore, we accept that the
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Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation is healthy and
do not include it in our later stage of analysis.
2) The liquidity ratios, particularly the liquid assets to
deposits and borrowed funds ratio, of Bank of Credit and
Commerce Hongkong Limited is much worse than the
industry average. Its leverage is also high when
compared to the other banks and its profitability is not
at all satisfactory. From its annual report and from
our visit to the bank, we learn that the bank is a 97
percent owned subsidiary of its holding company, Bank of
Credit and Commerce International Holding (Luxembourg)
S.A. The Group has over three hundred branches over the
world in more than seventy countries. Its top
management in Hongkong consists mainly of people of
Indian nationality. It is said that the capital funds
come mainly from the Middle East. We argue that Bank of
Credit and Commerce Hongkong Limited is basically a
branch of a foreign bank doing business in Hongkong,
instead of a real local-bank. From our interviews
with the bankers, it is confirmed that financial ratios
of the branch of foreign banks are normally weaker than
those of the local banks. This explains partly the
reason of the low liquidity and profitability of the
bank. Due to its foreign bank business nature, we are
not going to compare its ratios with the other local
banks. Also, since it is not a typical local bank, it
is not included in the subsequent analysis. However, it
should be stressed that we are not saying that the bank
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is not risky, but that it is not exactly our target
bank.
3) Although we cannot find the 1984 financials for the two
smallest banks in our population: Tai Sang Bank and Tai
Yau Bank, we notice from their 1983 ratios that they are
quite different from the other banks. Together with
Hong Nin Bank and Hongkong Chinese Bank, these four
local banks with total assets below HK$1,000 million
typically have smaller deposits and borrowed funds to
capital funds ratio, higher capital funds to loans ratio
and higher return to assets ratio than the other larger
local banks. Our later investigation suggests that
these banks have a different business nature from the
others. A section in the later stage will be given to
analyze these banks separately while their ratios will
not be compared with the others in this stage of
financial anaysis.
So far six banks have been excluded from the
financial analysis: the Hongkong Shanghai Banking
Corporation, Bank of Credit and Commerce Hongkong Limited,
Hong Nin Bank, Hong Kong Chinese Bank, Tai Yau Bank and Tai
Sang Bank. Because their business nature is not that of a
typical local bank, their ratios will not be used to
calculate the industry average in the financial analysis in
the following sections.
264.4 Liquidity
Two ratios are used for the purpose of assessing
liquidity- "liquid assets to deposits and borrowed funds"
and loans to deposits and borrowed funds". The ratios in
1984 of the "local banks are presented in Appendix 6. In
addition, two line graphs are plotted, one for each ratio,
in Appendix 7 and 8.
4.4.1 Liquid Assets to Deposits and Borrowed Funds
From the line graph plotted, it can be noticed that
the range for this ratio is very broad among the banks-
from the most liquid Shanghai Commercial Bank (67.3
percent) to the least liquid Ka Wah Bank (21.9 percent).
Although part of this difference may be due to their
different business scope, we believe that the banks whose
ratio is far below the general trend should be suffering
from liquidity problem. Considering the industry average
at 42.3 percent, we draw a line at 30 percent below which
the banks are considered weak in its liquidity.
Six banks are found to have liquid assets to deposits
and borrowed fund below 30 percent:




28.0%5) Wing On Bank
28.3%Far East Bank6)
274.4.2 Loans to Deposits and Borrowed Funds
Similar comparison is done for this ratio for 1984.
Again the ratios are in a very broad range. As the first
one, Shanghai Commercial Bank is the most liquid bank, with
loans only 34.0 percent of its deposits and borrowed
funds. The highest ratio, that is, the least liquid, again
belongs to Ka Wah Bank, with a ratio of 85.1 percent. The
industry average stood at 60.9 percent and we choose 70
percent to be our cutting point.
The following seven banks have loans to deposits and
borrowed funds smaller than 70:
1) Ka Wah Bank 85.1%
2) Bank of Canton 80.9%
3) Overseas Trust Bank 77.6%
4) Dao Heng Bank 76.3%
5) Union Bank of Hong Kong 72.2%
6) Wing On Bank 71.0%
7) Far East Bank 70.8%
So far, we have identified five banks which failed
our liquidity test using the two ratios: Ka Wah Bank,
Overseas Trust Bank, Dao Heng Bank, Wing On Bank and Far
East Bank. We conclude that they are having. liquidity
problem. For the three banks which have either one of the
ratios far poorer than the average, we have to further
examine their past performance.
Although Bank of Canton has a high loans to deposits
and borrowed funds ratio, its liquidity improved over the
fiscal year 1984. At year ended 1983, its liquid assets to
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deposits and borrowed funds is 21.1 percent (Appendix 4)
which impoved to 32.4 percent one year later. During the
same period, the loans to deposits and borrowed funds
improved from 95.1 percent to 80.9 percent. This is
evident that the bank is recovering from its liquidity
problem, if any, to a more acceptable level.
The case for Union Bank of Hong Kong is different.
Its liquid assets to deposits and borrowed funds at year
ended 1983 was 60.5 percent while its loans to deposits and
borrowed funds was 63.5 percent (Appendix 4). At year
ended 1984, they deteriorated to 46.2 percent and 72.2
percent respectively. This makes us believe that there are
problems with its management on liquidity so that it is
included in our list of banks with poor liquidity.
Based on similar reasoning, the Hong Kong Industrial
and Commercial Bank whose liquid assets to deposits and
borrowed funds and loans to deposits and borrowed funds
ratios deteriorated from 42.9 percent and 64.0 percent to
17.3 percent and 65.2 percent respectively is also
included.
Therefore, we have seven banks which we considered
poor in its liquidity position: Ka Wah Bank, Overseas Trust
Bank, Dao Heng Bank, Wing On Bank, Far East Bank, Union
Bank of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Industrial and Commercial
Bank.
294.5 Capital Adequacy
Two ratios are used for the purpose of assessing
capital adequacy- capital funds to loans" and deposits
and borrowed funds to capital funds. The ratios of the
banks in 1984 are shown in Appendix 6 and the line graphs
of the ratios except for the negative one are presented in
Appendix 9 and 10.
4.5.1 Capital Funds to Loans
It can be seen from Appendix 9 that except for four
banks, local banks' capital funds to loans ratios in 1984
lay in a close range between 12 percent to 25 percent.
Three banks were particularly adequate in capital funds
when compared to their loans: Sun Hung Kai Bank, Union Bank
of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Chinese Bank. Hong Kong
Industrial and Commercial Bank had a negative ratio due to
its tremendous loss in financial year 1984 which resulted
in a negative capital funds.
Since the ratios for most of the banks do not differ
much, we draw a line at a low 12 percent in order to
identify those banks with insufficient capital adequacy.
Only three banks are below 12 percent:
NA1) HK Industrial and Commercial
9.5%2) Wing On Bank
11.8%3) Far East Bank
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4.5.2 Deposits and Borrowed Funds to Capital Funds
Due to its negative capital funds, Hong Kong
Industrial and Commercial Bank again exhibited a negative
number. For the others, about half of them have a ratio
above 10. Since many of them lie in a close range from 11
to 13, we chose 13 to be our cutting point and banks with
deposits and borrowed funds to capital funds ratio higher
than 13 are picked out. Two banks fall into our list:
L) Hang Seng Bank 16.2
2) Wing On Bank 14.8
Assessing the banks' capital adequacy by using these
two ratios, we find two banks unacceptable- Hong Kong
Industrial and Commercial Bank and Wing On Bank. In 1984,
the former had a negative capital funds which was obviously
inadequate while the latter had both of the ratios much
poorer than the industry. Far East Bank and Hang Seng Bank
were also poor in one of the ratios and we are going to
note them as having some problems in their capital
adequacy.
4.6 Profitability
Two-ratios are used for the purpose of assessing
profitability- return on*equity and return on assets"
The local banks' return ratios can be seen in Appendix 5
and 6. In 1984, three banks had negative net profit and
therefore it is meaningless to calculate their ratios of
31return (we denote their ratios with NA). They are Hang
Lung Bank, Wing On Bank and Hong Kong Industrial and
Commercial Bank. They are obviously having profitability
problems. The two ratios for the rest of the banks in our
list are plotted in Appendix 11 and 12.
4.6.1 Return on Equity(ROE)
From the line graph plotted, the ratios of the banks
differ a great deal, from 0.5 percent (Union Bank of Hong
Kong) to 25.7 percent (Hang Seng Bank). By considering
that the average ROE is 11.1 percent, we decide to classify
those banks with ROE ratio lower than five percent as
having profitability problem. There are altogether five
banks falling into this category
1) Union Bank of Hong Kong 0.5%
2) Sun Hung Kai Bank 2.9%
3) Overseas Trust Bank 3.5%
4) Dao Heng Bank 3.7%
5) Far East Bank\ 4.7%
Together with the three banks which have incurred a
loss in the financial year 1984, we have eight banks whose
ROE ratio is not up to the standard.
4.6.2 Return on Assets (ROA)
The same three banks showed negative ratios in their
1984 ROA ratios and are therefore considered as having poor
profitability. For the rest of the local banks, Wing Lung
Bank was the most profitable in terms of their assets, with
an ROA ratio of 1.6 percent. Again, the poorest
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performance was the Union Bank of Hong Kong, having a ratio
of only 0.1 percent. We set the standard at 0.5 percent
and only three of them did not meet it:
1) Union Bank of Hong Kong 0.1%
2) Overseas Trust Bank 0.4%
3) Far East Bank 0.4%
4) Dao Heng Bank 0.5%
5) Sun Hung Kai Bank 0.5%
So far, the eight banks included in our selection are
identical when assessing both of the ratios. Obviously, we
consider Hang Lung Bank, Wing On Bank and Hong Kong
Industrial and Commercial Bank as having problem in their
profitabilty due to their losses incurred in 1984. For the
other five, Sun Hung Kai Bank is excluded from the
problematic list in view of its adequacy in capital and the
transfer of ownership from Fung King Key to the Arabia
Banking Corporation in 1985 which made it effectively a
i ffpren hank.
4.7 The Selection Criteria
After assessing the banks' liquidity, capital
adequacy and profitability separately, we now come to the
process of selecting a few banks for the next stage of
qualitative analysis. Basically, we choose those banks
which are weak in any of th*e three criteria. However,
after careful investigation, it is found that some of them
are different from the others.
Although Hang Seng Bank was poor in its capital
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adequacy, its profitability is exceptionally good when
compared to the other local banks. Its ROE of 25.7 percent
is the highest among the banks while its ROA of 1.5 percent
is way above the average of 1.0 percent. Considering its.
large size and huge deposits base, we can accept its maybe
poorer capital adequacy. Given its strong parentage- the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation- we are not
going to include it in our analysis in the next stage which
is supposed given to the problematic banks.
Overseas Trust Bank and Hong Kong Industrial and
Commercial Bank are chosen when considering almost any of
the three financial criteria. These two banks have of
course performed badly, and that is the reason for Overseas
Trust Bank's failure in 1984. Hong Kong Industrial and
Commercial Bank, which is a subsidiary of it, was also
involved in the failure and both of them are taken over by
the Government. In the chapter below, we consider them as
actually the safest banks due to Government ownership. As
a result, we are not going to discuss their qualitative
aspects in the next chapter.
Hang Lung Bank suffered a loss in 1984, and therefore
we consider its profitabilty poor. However, based on the
reasoning for overseas Trust Bank and Hong Kong Industrial
and Commercial Bank, we exclude Hang Lung Bank which is
still run by the Government.
Therefore, five banks are selected for the analysis
in the next chapter- Dao Heng Bank, Ka Wah Bank, Union
Bank of Hong Kong, Wing On Bank.-and Far East Bank.
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CHAPTER 5
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS- THE PROBLEMATIC BANKS
In the last chapter, basing on the ratios in
liquidity, capital adequacy and profitability, we have
identified five banks for further analysis. Here, we shall
examine them one by one in the areas of ownership,
management, loan portfolio and finally their future
viability. However, since information concerning these
variables can hardly be found in published statements of
the banks, we based our discussion on information obtained
from periodicals, newspapaer, magazines and experienced
bankers.
5.1 The Dao Heng Bank Limited (DHB)
DHB was incorporated in Hongkong in 1921 and in 1970,
Grindlays Bank of London-purchased a majority interest in
the bank. The acquisition enabled Grindlays to operate in
Hongkong through DHB during the period when there was a
moratorium on bank licences. In March 1982, the Hong Leong
Company (Malaysia) Berhad acquired control of DHB from
Grindlays.
The Hong Leong Group is owned and controlled by the
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Quek family based in Malaysia. It is a diversified
conglomerate with broad business activities in Malaysia,
Singapore and Hongkong.
DHB ranks 13th in terms of total assets amongst the
27 local banks in our population. It engages in a wide
range of retail and commercial banking services in Hongkong
through a network of 22 branches.
5.1.1 Ownership
DHB is 100 percent owned by the publicly listed Hong
Leong Company under the control of the Quek family. Before
February 1986, Hong Leong was owned 60 percent by Hong
Leong Overseas (HK) Limited, 20 percent by Kuwait
Investment Office (KIO) and 20 percent by general public.
(See Appendix 13)
In February 1986, Hong Leong Company announced that
new capital will be injected into the company by means of
rights issue in order to strengthen the capital base of
DHB. The injection is mainly from KIO and after the rights
issue, KIO will increase its shareholdings in the company
from 20 percent to more than 40 percent of the issued share
capital while the Hong Leong Group will have its holdings
reduced to about 45 percent.
Hong Leong Overseas Limited is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Hong Leong (Malaysia) Berhad under the Quek
Leng-chan. The group started as a trading company 20 years
ago in Malaysia with a very close relationship with Hong
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Leong group of companies controlled by the Kwek family in
Singapore. It is one of the heavy weights of Southeast
Asia and retains an important position in the trading and
distribution sectors in these two countries. Over the
years, the Hong Leong Group has not only spread its
activities-geographically to UK, Middle East and Hongkong,
it has also expanded its lines of business. Besides
trading and finance, its operations include manufacturing,
mining, hotels, shipbuilding and repair, insurance,
assembly of cars, and distribution of franchised products.
KIO is a London based Middle East company. It is
operated by the Kuwait Ministry of Finance and has investec
billions of US dollars annually from Kuwait's petroleum
reserves.
As both Hong Leong Group and KIO are financially
resourceful in their respective home countries, together
with good business track record, it is unlikely that they,
particularly the Hong Leong Group, will walk away from DHB
in times of difficulties as this would cause major
repercussion on their other business interests, and
severely damage their images.
5.1.2 Management
The Chairman of Hong Leong Lompany, cuex Leng-cnan,
who is also the Chairman of Hong Leong Malaysia Group,
resides in Kuala Lumpur but commutes to Hongkong on a
monthly basis to review DHB's operation. DHB is supervised
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by the Chairman's younger brothers, Leng-hai (Managing
Director) and Leng-san (General manager, institutional).
Though relatively younger, they have much experience in
working with various operating entities within the Group
before being assigned to their respective management
positions in DHB.
While key executive roles are held by members of Quek
family, they are well supported by professional non-family
career managers such as Vivian Lee (General Manager, Head
Office Banking) and Leung Kin-hee (General Manager, Branch
Banking), who are well known and respected within the local
banking community.
In the aftermath of the OTB crisis, DHB experienced a
run-off in customers' deposits. This had not created major
problems to the bank. Management was able to handle the
sudden loss of depositors' confidence solely through DHB's
internal resources. Disclosed to us by an insider, DHB had
not drawn from the credit facilities with corresponding
banks to resolve the situation but relied its required
funds primarily on its customers' deposits. The prudence
of DHB's management was further evident in the big
provisions for doubtful loans made in 1985. Though it had
adversely affected the bank's profit, it improved the long
term quality of its accounts. As a matter of fact, the
prudent policy of DHB's management earns good reputation
within the local banking community.
385.1.3 Loan Portfolio
During the financial year ending June 30,1985, DHB's
total consolidated loan base showed a moderate increase
from HK$2,158 million to HK$2,223 million (an increase of
5.5 percent). The moderate increase in the bank's loan
portfolio was primarily due to a generally sluggish demand
for bank credit in the year. This also showed defensive
posture of DHB's management with regard to maintaining a
higher level of liquidity. The substantial provisions and
write-offs for doubtful and bad loans in the same
financial year had also improved DHB's portfolio quality.
DHB's doubtful debts amounted to a healthy 3.4 percent of
its total loan portfolio.
An important part of DHB's business is home mortgage
loans. This type of financing accounts for about 40
percent of DHB's portfolio. They are mostly secured on
the property purchased after careful credit assessment.
DHB is also active in trade-related financing which made
up about 40 percent of the bank's portfolio.
Trade-related financing are generally on short term basis
and mainly extended to middle market customers on a
secured basis with emphasis on collateral quality.
Approximately 15 percent of DHB's portfolio are term
exposure including loans to locally based entities such as
MTRC and non-group related project financing in Malaysia.
Totally, approximately 85 percent of DHB's loan portfolio
is secured.
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Insiders commented on the portfolio quality of the
bank as good because there are adequate check points in the
credit approval and control process, enabling the balance
of views in order to ensure the quality of loans extended.
5.1.4 Future Viability
The OTB crisis was an unfortunate event resulting in
loss of confidence among general depositors towards
financial institutions owned by Southeast Asian interests.
DHB was no exception. The market sensitivity caused
unexpected liquidity pressure. DHB's management was able
to ease the situation solely through its own internal
resources, that is, through the use of liquid assets to
meet liability obligations.
In fact, DHB's management is fully aware of the
confidence factor and is committed to ensuring long term
viability of the bank. Alongside with the depressed
financial climate in Malaysia, Hong Leong Company Limited,
of which DHB is a wholly owned subsidiary, announced in
February 1986 that both the controlling shareholders, the
Hong Leong group of Malaysia and KIO will inject new
capital into it in order to strengthen the capital base of
DHB. The move not only places the bank in a better
position to compete.in an increasingly difficult market and
to meet the new capital requirements in the new banking
bill, it also helps to improve the bank's image and
enhances public confidence. DHB becomes less susceptible to
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unexpected market nervousness and thus may reduce its
liquidity pressure.
For over 60 years, DHB has been serving the community
and, through its branch network, it has built up a broad
individual depositor base, especially in the middle to
lower class and the older age group. In 1985, DHB
maintained over 15,000 current and savings accounts. It
made up 85 percent of the bank's funding requirement and
DHB acted as a net lender of funds in the interbank market.
Although the performance last year was disappointing,
the substantial drop in profits was largely caused by local
market's sensitivity towards Southeast Asian ownership
rather than DHB's internal problems. Given the committed
ownership, conservative management style, good quality of
loan portfolio, and funding capability, investors or
depositors can be confident in DHB.
5.2 The Far East Bank Limited (FEB)
FEB was founded in 1960 by Deacon Chiu who is also
the founder and head of the Far East Group. In 1969,
Citibank took control of FEB by acquiring a 76 percent
interest in the bank and for the following years until
1982, ran FEB as a consumer bank. In 1982, due to the
difference in business philosophy between Citibank and
Deacon Chiu, the Chiu family bought back the controlling
interest of FEB with the help of Hongkong Bank, which
acquired 10 percent interest in FEB as a sign of support,
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In addition, Banque Worms of France and W.H. Chou, a local
manufacturer, acquired 10 percent and 5 percent interest
respectively.
In June 1985, Sino Master International, a joint
venture between China Merchants Steam Navigation and the US
based Search Group, acquired 25 percent of FEB by
purchasing 10 percent from Hongkong Bank and 15 percent
from the Chiu family. As a result, FEB is presently owned
by the Chiu family, Sino Master, Banque Worms and W.H.
Chou.
FEB ranked 22nd among the 27 local banks in terms of
assets in 1985. With a network of 34 branches in
Hongkong, FEB is a consumer-oriented bank active in
end-user residential mortgages, consumer credits, trade
finance and related financial services.
5.2.1 Ownership
After the 25% acquisition of FEB interest by the Sino





Besides FEB, Deacon Chiu also founded the Far East
Group. The group of companies involves in real estate,
hotel operations, entertainment business, TV station, cargo
terminal, food ingredient manufacturing and fashion
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retailing. In the local business community, Deacon Chiu is
regarded as a controversial personality for he is said to
be always trying to negotiate a deal entirely to his own
favour. Nevertheless, he is a successful businessman and
an aggressive and resourceful entrepreneur. Furthermore,
as a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, he is well connected with many influential
figures in the PRC. It is unlikely that Chiu will fold his
arms in case problems arise in FEB because this will
greatly affect his image, his family business and his
creditworthiness.
As a partner in Sino Master International, China
Merchants Steam Navigation (CMSN) is a Beijing incorporated-
company owned 100% by the Ministry of Communication of
PRC. Established in 1872, CMSN is a diversified group,
with shipping, transportation and manufacturing interests
inside and outside China. Being a large, financially
strong, PRC-backed enterprise, CMSN's investment in FEB has
been taken by general business community as the PRC
government's vote of confidence and support in FEB.
The other two shareholders of FEB are Banque Worms
and W.H. Chou. Not much can be discussed about them due to
limited information. All we know is that the latter is a
local textile manufacturer and, although Banque Worms has
never participated in the'day-to-day affairs of FEB, it has
involved in the bank's major strategic decisions.
435.2.2 Management
Three key persons can be identified in the top
management level of FEB: Deacon Chiu - Chairman, Dick Chiu
- Managing Director, and Thomas Chu - General Manager and
Director.
Deacon Chiu, although a controversial figure in the
local business circle, is a well-experienced and skillful
executive.
Dick Chiu, Deacon's eldest son and a Cambridge
graduate, has held various positions in the Far East
Consortium. He is considered to be competent and has major
influence within the Group.
Thomas Chu, a long time employee of Citibank when FEB
was majority owned by Citibank, stayed with FEB after the
split of FEB and Citibank in 1982. He has been serving in
banking for over 15 years with exposure in different areas
of the industry.
Just like Thomas Chu, key managers of FEB are typical
experienced career bankers. According to our banking
sources, the management team of FEB is considered to be
experienced and quite conservative in local banking
community.
5.2.3 Loan Portfolio
FEB has been active in the residential mortgage
financing. The bank has over 70 percent of its portfolio
in form of residential mortgages while the remaining
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portion distributes among trade financing, syndication
loans, stock broking and margin financing. Almost all
these activities are committed in Hongkong. Besides, over
90 percent of its loans is secured by collateral such as
apartment flats, marketable securities and cash, etc. In
view of these factors, FEB's portfolio is of high quality.
In 1984, there was no substantial write-off and
provision for bad debts. This further indicates that FEB
has careful credit assessment procedure and adequate
allowance for doubtful loans.
5.2.4 Future Viability
We have pointed out in the section of ratio analysis
that liquidity position and capital adequacy position of
FEB were below industry average for the financial year
1984. However, this was caused by the bank's active
involvement in secured residential mortgage and secured
share margin financings, while other local banks in
Hongkong maintained high liquidity in this period as a
result of sluggish export market and therefore lacking
lending opportunities. Consequently,. FEB reported an
increase of 4.5 percent in net income in 1984 when most
banks in Hongkong reported decreased earnings.
Additionally, in absolute terms, FEB's capital base has
maintained consistent growth over the past 3 years
averaging 3.5 percent per annum.
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In the area of funding capability, FEB's lendings are
100 percent funded by customers' deposits. As of December
31, 1984, total deposits reached 140 percent of the entire
loan portfolio. The strong deposit base has made FEB a
constant net lender in the interbank market. In the years
when the public lacked confidence in local family-owned
banks, FEB managed to upkeep the growth in deposits, which
came mainly from stable individual depositors. As a matte
of fact, the image of 'kai-fong's' bank has deeply rooted
in the lower class, for instance, owners of small shops,
blue-collar workers, hawkers, fishermen, farmers. This
contributes to the successful viability of FEB in Hongkong
FEB has been able to maintain support from its
depositors and correspondent banks due primarily to the
ownership and/or the support of Citibank, Hongkong Bank an(
Banque Worms. The admittance of CMSN as a shareholder in
1985 has further strengthened the already good connection
of FEB in China and places FEB in a better position to mor(
effectively capture PRC-related business. than other local
banks.
Meanwhile, in view of lack of public confidence and
vulnerability to rumours about small local banks, the Chiu
family is actively seeking stronger partners to back FEB.
Banking source disclosed that interest parties included an
European finance group, the Kuala Lumpur-based Malaysia
Borneo Finance Corporation Berhad under the MBf Group, and
the PRC-owned CMSN, which has already had 25 percent stake
in the FEB. This clearly shows that the intention of the
46Chiu family to strengthen the bank's capital base,
management and competitiveness.
Presently, the risk associated with FEB is
liquidity. In case the bank were affected by rumour, it
may cause drainage in its deposits. However, in light of
the favorable factors it possesses, FEB should be able to
survive.
5.3 The Ka Wah Bank Limited (KWB)
KWB was originally founded by Lam Chi-fung, who is
also the founder of Baptist College and Baptist Hospital.
Ct was incorporated in Hongkong in 1924 and in 1974, Low
:hung-song and his brothers from Singapore, acquired the
:ontrol interest in KWB from the Lam family and took over
:he management. After the collapse of OTB, public
:onfidence in banks with Southeast Asian ownership began to
leteriorate. Coincident with the enormous doubtful loans
hose as a result of the deepening troubles of Pan-Electric
Endustries Limited in Singapore, Low family was forced to
jive up control in the bank in March 1986, in order to save
:he bank, to a more resourceful party, China International
Crust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). The rescue plan
^equired CITIC to spend HK$350 million, which accounts for
ever 90 percent interest,-to buy the bank.
Before the acquisition by CITIC, KWB has already been
Serving in Hongkong for over 60 years. It is the 9th
largest locally incorporated banks in terms of total assets
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and operates 31 local branches in Hongkong, two overseas
branches in Los Angeles and New York, two representative
offices in Toronto, Canada, and Xiamen, China.
KWB's principal activities include a wide range of
commercial banking services for private and corporate
customers in Hongkong and Southeast Asia.
5.3.1 Ownership
KWB obtained listing in Hongkong stock market in Jun(
1980. Shares are primarily held through nominee companies
(see Appendix 14). Banking sources estimated that the Low
family had both direct and indirect shareholdings in excess
of 50 percent in KWB. Only about 25 percent is in the
hands of the public.
According to the announcement in March 1986, CITIC
will acquire 95 percent of the equity of the bank and will
assume overall responsibility for KWB's management and
operations.
Like the owners of Carrian, Hang Lung and OTB, the
Low family shared with them the common trait of Southeast
Asian ownership. Besides KWB, the Low family has
diversified business interests in Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand, comprising manufacturing, plantation, real
estate, brokerage and security financings. In 1974, when
the Low brothers took control of KWB from the Lam family,
the bank incurred heavy loan losses and went into financial
difficulties. In the following six years until public
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listing, the old portfolio was successfully worked down anc
new loans booked. Low brothers' high commitment in KWB is
well known in the market. Due to their connections,
sizable Southeast Asian business was captured.
Nevertheless, these connections also catalyzed the loss of
public confidence in KWB and its final acquisition by
CITIC.
CITIC, which is directly responsible to China's State
Council, has been negotiating a takeover of Ka Wah since
the middle of 1985. Final agreement was reached in March
1986 when the Hongkong Government promised to guarantee the
collectability of KWB's massive doubtful. debts for a period
of three years with the Exchange Fund.
With its head office in Peking, CITIC was set up to
tap foreign financing and know-how for China's
modernization and enjoys a high international reputation.
The takeover means a better relationship between KWB
and the Bank of China group. Together with the strong
support of the Hongkong Government, the financial and
business base of KWB will be substantially strengthened.
5.3.2 Management
Our discussion here will be limited to the period
before restructuring of KWB's management hierarchy as a
result of CITIC's takeover.
All the three Low brothers, Chung-song, Chang-hian
and Chun-seng, were actively involved in the management of
49the bank. They have a high regard for good professional
managers and are not reluctant to promote people from
outside the family. They are committed to their investment
in the bank. Chung-song acted as Deputy Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer while his two brothers as Executive
Chairman.
Two members in Lam family, the former owner of KWB,
remained in the board level: Dr. Danial Lam (Chairman) and
Alex Lam (Executive Director). Dr. Lam is renowned in
Hongkong and still serves actively as chairman and board
member of various colleges and schools. Among them,
Baptist College, Pui Ching Middle School, Munsang College.
His brother, Alex Lam, is experienced in banking and has
been the General Manager of the bank since 1958.
The other two Executive Directors are Tan Soo-kiu and
Victor Tan. They are Singaporean and Malaysian
respectively. Both of them have over 10 years experience
with banking and financial activities. Bankers consider
KWB's management professional, resourceful and
knowledgeable. In the liquidity crisis caused by the
aftermath of the failure of OTB, KWB was able to stabilize
the financial strain without restoring to the HK$1 billion
standby line of credit provided by the Hongkong Bank and
Bank of China.
However, the takeover can be blamed on the management
for two reasons. First, they were aggressive in its
lendinq activities (loans to deposit: 85 percent). Second,
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they were not alert enough in the face of depressed
financial climate in Singapore and Malaysia and retreated
from these countries early. The deepened financial
troubles in Pan-Electric Industrial Limited of Singapore
and the arrest of its major owner, Tan Koon-swan, was a
detrimental blow on the Low brothers' rein of KWB.
5.3.3 Loan Portfolio
Because of the good connection of Low brothers in
Southeast Asian countries, management of KWB emphasized
more on trade and-industrial lendings in this region.
Over 30 percent of its loans were lent to borrowers
in this region while approximately 40 percent of the total
were trade-related. 80 percent of the total loans were
secured by cash, property and/or blue chips shares, and
personal guarantees were normally insisted on as a basis of
accommodation. If one judges the asset quality of KWB
merely from these information, one may conclude that it is
acceptable. However, a report disclosed that an estimated
HK$350 million was linked to Tan Koon-swan, the majority
owner of Pan-Electric, either borrowed or guaranteed by
him. The arrest of Tan in Singapore, with its market
effect on the business climate in the neighboring countries
had increased the risks associated with KWB's loan
portfolio. Insiders estimated that the incidence had
forced, KWB to increase its bad debt provisions from HK$350
million to HK$650 million, which exceeded Ka Wah's HK$550
million capital and reserve in hand.
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5.3.4 Future Viability
The Ka Wah case is the 4th local bank rescued by the
Hongkong Government through the Exchange Fund. Instead of
direct takeover as in the previous cases, the Government
acted as a guarantor on the collectability of Ka Wah's
outstanding loans for three years. The support of the
Government, together with the strong financial background
of its new owner, CITIC, will greatly mitigate market
sensitivity against KWB and improve its relationship with
other local banks. As the bank is no longer owned by
Southeast Asian businessmen, depositors' confidence in it
may be restored, which in turn will enhance its funding
capability. The long term viability of KWB is now
depending on the new management team after restructuring.
5.4 Union Bank of Hong Kong Limited (UBHK)
UBHK was founded by Oen Yin-choy and incorporated in
Hongkong in 1964. it has been strongly controlled by Oen
as he is both the Chairman and Chief Executive holding
about 60 percent of the bank's stake.
UBHK has a network of 12 branches in Hongkong and
ranked 20th in 1984 in terms of total assets among the 27
local banks in our sample. Its principle activities,
including those of its subsidiaries, are general banking
and related financial services, property and share
investments as well as conducting general insurance
business.
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In March 1986, shortly after the acquisition of Ka
Wah Bank by CITIC with Government's assistance, UBHK becam
the 5th local bank being rescued by Hongkong Government.
In an announcement by the Commissioner of Banking, Robert
Fell, the Government would temporarily take over the
management of UBHK and appoint Jardine Fleming, a local
merchant bank, to run Union Bank on behalf of the
Commissioner. In addition, the Exchange Fund was also
making available a substantial credit line to the bank
sufficient for meeting the claims of all depositors and
other creditors.
The occasion happened because of the reported sick
and prolonged absence of UBHK's Chairman, Oen Yin-choy,
from Hongkong since last September, and the resignation of
six directors, leaving the bank in a deteriorating
liquidity position and without management direction.
5.4.1 Ownership
As said in the above, Oen Yin-choy owns about 60
percent of Union Bank's stake. Other major shareholders
are friends of Oen. Therefore,.. he was in full control of
the bank. However, few people know his background well as
he seldom appear in local social circles. We are told that
he has good connection with Southeast Asian businessmen,
especially the Indonesians. Also, in the past few years,
he was quite outspoken in criticizing government's economic
policies, such as non-intervention, high land price and
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deficit budgeting. Friends of Oen described him as a
reliable, pragmatic, enthusiastic and generous person and a
good businessman.
We have no comment on UBHK's ownership for lack of
information. But the centralized management control by one
person is surely found unsatisfactory by the Commissioner
of Banking.
5.4.2 Management
In the 1984 annual report of UBHK, it was disclosed
that the major source of income came from lending in the
interbank market, and the bank maintained a high liquidity
position. However, in 1984, loans to deposits ratio of the
bank was approximately 70 percent, almost doubled that of
Hang Seng Bank, Bank of East Asia and Wing Lung Bank.
Consequently, risk exposure to bad debts was much higher
than other more conservative banks. Although the
management had explained that the 90 percent drop in profit
in 1984 was due to slack loans demands, marketers began to
feel uncomfortable about the financial health of the bank
because of its high risk exposure.
The situation became worse when the bank suffered
from some doubtful loans extended in 1984 to Southeast
Asian borrowers. Its auditors, Cooper and Lybrand,
questioned the recoverability of a sum of HK$265 million
loans due from several overseas customers, notably
Indonesians. Although the auditors were subsequently
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satisfied with the additional personal assets pledged by
Oen against these loans, rumour on the financial health of
the bank continued to circulate, causing a steady shift of
depositors, mainly from the public, away from the bank. To
make the situation worse, management of UBHK had not done
anything to clarify.
Insiders comment on the present problems of UBHK as a
result of weak lending policies and the loss of public
confidence in small local banks associated with Southeast
Asian business after the OTB crisis. Personal
relationship, together with conservative business
philosophy, is certainly detrimental to the long term
health of this bank in face of the growing stringent
banking supervision and the keen competition in the
industry.
Furthermore, operations in a healthy organization
should not be seriously affected by the absence of one
person. One of the reasons contributing to the Government
takeover of UBHK demonstrates the inefficiency of the
bank's internal structure and its management team.
5.4.3 Loan Portfolio
No available information enables us to assess the
asset quality of UBHK. Bankers told us that UBHK's
portfolio was quite diversified but a significant portion
was committed in Southeast Asian countries.
55
5.4.4 Future Viability
As well said by the Commissioner of Banking, a
temporary takeover of UBHK's management was necessary in
the interest of depositors. The action was proved to be
appropriate as there was no obvious drainage of deposits
out of the bank after the takeover. The immediate measures
that Jardine Fleming should take in order to stabilize the
bank's position are to improve its liquidity and
concentrate on its overdue loans.
Meanwhile, it was reported that, Oen Yin-choy, who
has left Hongkong for half a year, is believed to have
talked with a US party for the sale of the bank.
The temporary takeover was further proved to be a
correct measure as it could nurse the bank into better
shape and make it attractive for a prospective buyer.
The viability of UBHK depends largely on the
operations under the management of Jardine Fleming and
whether it can find a stronger equity partner.
5.5 The Winq On Bank Limited (WOB)
WOB was established in December 1932 by Kwok Chuen
and Kwok Lok. Serving in Hongkong for 54 years under the
control of Kwok family, WOB ranked 19th in 1984 in terms of
total assets among the 27 local banks in our sample. With
a network of 24 branches in Hongkong, WOB is engaged in the
nrnvision of banking and related financial services. The
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rein of Kwok family came to an end in December 1985 when
Hang Seng Bank acquired the controlling interests of WOB.
The purchase itself was a rescue of WOB. The bank
first signalled problems in May 1985, when it announced a
HK$120 million net loss for 1984. In May 1984, its
publicly quoted parent, Wing On Holdings (WOH) underwrote a
HK$119 million rights issue needed to offset the HK$142
million of loans write-offs, in order to keep the bank in
business. However the injection had not alleviated the
deteriorating situation and in December 1985,
recapitalization exercise was needed to save WOB's balance
sheet from an insupportable weight of doubtful loans.
The recapitalization plan included three steps:
1) the bank's existing share capital was written down from
HK$200 million to HK$20 million
2) WOH underwrote a HK$154 million rights issue
3) Hang Seng bank subscribed HK$176 million for a 50.3
percent stake in WOB's enlarged HK$350 million share
capital.
After the May rights issue, WOH's stake in WOB was
believed to have risen from 51 percent to about 70 percent
and after the recent one, the Kwoks may hold less than 10
percent of WOB.
The purchase of WOB was generally considered as a
cheap deal because usually buyers have to pay a price
higher than the par value of the existing shares. However,
Hang Seng was buying at par of the newly written down
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shares. It paid HK$176 million to acquire 50.3 percent
stake while WOH had spent HK$273 million in the two rights
issue for a smaller stake. In addition, HK$100 million was
used to buy 10 million cumulative, convertible preference
shares (HK$10 per share). This will generate 12 percent
interest each year. Even without dividends payout on the
common shares in the first few years, Hang Seng Bank will
earn a not-too-low 6.82 percent return per year for,its
HK$176 million investment.
5.5.1 Ownership
Before the acquisition by Hang Seng Bank, WOB is
majority owned by WOH. Besides banking, the Wing On group
involved in insurance, investments, land and property, and
department stores. The Kwok family owned 40 percent
interest in the WOH and retained key positions in
management of both WOH and WOB. Under the control of the
Kwok family, WOH owned about 70 percent of WOB after the
May rights issue. The remaining stake was in the hands of
members and associates of the Kwok family.
The new owner, Hang Seng Bank, is the 2nd largest
local banks in terms of total assets. It became a
subsidiary of Hongkong Bank 20 years ago in a banking
crisis. Throughout these years, it has earned good public
image and public depositors' confidence. In the banking
circle, its management is highly praised. Though
conservative, it remains profitable.
585.5.2 Management
Before changing hands, Kwok family was not only the
largest shareholders of WOB, they also retained key
positions in its management. In December 1984, out of
thirteen board members, six were members of Kwok family.
At the same time, the Kwoks acted as Chairman (Philip
Kwok), Chief Manager (Albert Kwok), Assistant Chief Manager
(Karl C. Kwok) and Deputy Chief Manager (Kwok Man-chiu) in
WOB.
General comments on this management team were not
very good. They were criticized for their failure to
strengthen the bank in the past 20 years, in which
Hongkong's economy had been rapidly developed. Not to
mention Hang Seng Bank, WOB's growth was much slower than
many banks originally smaller than it. In this period,
they were unable to explore market opportunity and always
adopted a "follower" strategy.
Another criticism was that the management was not*
alert enough to observe economic trend. Occasionally, they
made wrong decisions at the wrong time. An obvious example
was that they could not consciously estimate the impact
following the uncertainty brought by the question of 1997
on local property market. Contrary to their optimistic
expectations, the property market slumped in the early
1980s, bringing a huge loss to WOB as a large part of its
lendings in this period became bad debts, or due to falling
price in collateral. In fact, lacking banking expertise
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and mismanagement directly led to the takeover by Hang Seng
Bank.
5.5.3 Loan Portfolio
The asset quality of WOB was questionable because the
management had relied too much on lendings to a particular
sector- property market. The high exposure is always
considered risky for the potential difficulties it may
bring in times of economic downturn.
As mentioned previously, wrong projection caused
over-relying on property market in the period 1981-83. Big
losses incurred as a result of borrowing companies'
liquidation as well as decreased value of collateral
insufficient to cover initial lendings. According to
market information, cumulated loss due to bad debts might
have already exceeded the total net assets value.
5.5.4 Future Viability
After the takeover, WOB's operations remain
independent from Hang Seng Bank. Things that the new owner
should do include restructuring the management team,
establishing a more efficient internal structure and
enhancing the asset quality.
Since the depositor-base of WOB is local Chinese,
similar to that of Hang Seng Bank, the injection and new




OUTLOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKS WITH LOCAL CAPITAL
6.1 Categorization
We have examined five banks in the last chapter quite
thoroughly. Before we formulate our view on the viability
of local banks, we shall briefly discuss the remaining 22
banks. These banks may be categorized into four groups.
Group I- The Largest Banks
This group consists of:
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
Hang Seng Bank Limited
The Bank of East Asia, Limited
Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited
They are the largest in terms of total assets among
the 27 local banks in our sample, and they have earned
highest profits for years in absolute terms.
With its long history of establishment in Hongkong
and an asset size exceeding the total of all local banks,
Hongkong Bank plays a leading role in the local financial
sector and acts as the Government's banker.
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The other three banks in this group maintain a high
liquidity position and seem to be very conservative in
their lending policies. Yet, they are much profitable than
one would expect for their high liquidity.
The crises in the past few years caused a shift of
public confidence to those banks with strong capital base,
and so did the deposits. Banks in this group definitely
benefit from this trend and become more powerful in
capturing business.
Group II- The Most Reliable Banks
Banks in this group include:
Hang Lung Bank, Limited
Overseas Trust Bank Limited
Hong Kong Industrial & Commercial Bank Limited
From the depositors' point of view, risks incurred in
these banks are the least because of the tremendous
financial support from the Exchange Fund and the
experienced executives appointed by the Government after
the takeovers.
As early sale of these banks are unlikely because
they have not recovered fully yet, we may be confident that
the Government will continue to nurse them to healthy
conditions.
Group III- Banks With Big Brothers
The majority of local banks falls into this group.
Most of them are originally small to medium-sized in terms
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of total assets, and they are family owned with a limited
capital base. Due to the keen competition in the banking
industry and a shift in depositors' confidence in recent
years, more and more were forced to seek support from some
financially resourceful parties, especially the
international financial institutions. These foreign
capital injection have not only restored public confidence
in these banks, but also enhanced their international
connections. A list of banks in this group and their
principal shareholders is shown below:
Table 4
Banks and their "Big Brothers"
Principal Shareholders
Name of Bank their Holdings
Security Pacific CorporationThe Bank of Canton, Limited
(100%)
Bank of Credit and Commerce BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg)
S.A. (97%)
rhAki anti Firt Rank limited Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank (33%)
American International
Assurance Co. Ltd. (12.5%)
Bangkok Bank Ltd. (34%)The Commercial Bank of Hong
Kong Limited Tokai Bank Ltd., Japan (10%)
Worthen Banking Group, USAThe Hong Kong Chinese Bank,
Limited (100%)
Kwong On Bank, Limited Fuji Bank (55%)
Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited Mitsibishi Bank (25%)
Arabian Banking CorporationSun Hung Kai Bank Limited
(75%)
Crescent Services Inc. (25%)
Irving Trust Co., N.Y. (51%)Wing Hang Bank, Limited
Standard Chartered Bank (13%)Wing Lung Bank Limited
63Plus those which have already been discussed:
Dao Heng Bank Limited Kuwait Investment Office (40%)
Far East Bank Limited Sino Master International (25%)
The Ka Wah Bank, Limited CITIC (95%)
The Wing On Bank Limited Hang Seng Bank Limited (51%)
Group IV- The Small, Family Owned Banks
Banks in this group are characterized by small asset
size, high liquidity position and limited business
activities. They are either possessing established
clientele base or serving for their families' other
business. Since they seldom extend large loans to
outsiders, they remain untouched in spite of the fierce
competition and the aftermath of OTB's failure, even without
the support of big brothers.
Potential risks are still inherent in these banks.
Unlike the previous examples, their small size and inactive
nature may not induce government's rescue if problems arise
in them. The Government will, without hesitation, let them
close down.
A list of these banks with their controlling families
is shown below:
Table 5
Small Family Owned Banks
FamilyName of Bank
WongDah Sing Bank, Limited
LeeHong Nin Bank, Limited
MaTai Sang Bank, Limited
KoTai Yau Bank Limited
YeeUnited Chinese Bank, Limited
646.2 Keen Competition in Banking Industry
For a long time, Hongkong Government has claimed
itself to be adopting positive non-intervention policy
toward the economy. With its intention to cultivate
Hongkong as a financial centre, the Government allows more
and more foreign banks to set up shops in Hongkong. Most
of them are of high repute and many of them are well
managed. Although most of the foreign competitors have
placed more emphasis on offshore business and merchant
banking, they began to develop their consumer services,
like Citibank and Chase Manhattan. These internationally
renowned financial institutions compete for local customers.
with their efficient and high quality services.
Particularly after the outburst of crisis in local banks,
foreign banks further gained the confidence of individual
depositors because of their resourceful parents.
Another powerful competitor is the Bank of China
group. This group of-banks-has developed rapidly and
adopted more aggressive posture in recent years in order to
capture a bigger market share. With the formation of
JETCO, they provide a better customer service. On the
other hand, since the sister banks of Bank of China are
backed by the PRC government, public depositors are
confident in these banks-especially under the present
stable political environment in China. This adds the
strength of this group to compete.
65Therefore, in the foreseeable future, these
competitors will eat into the market share of small local
banks in the area of consumer banking, which will make
banks' operations more difficult.
6.3 Stringent Supervision on Banking Industry
Following the collapse of the Hang Lung Bank, the
Overseas Trust Bank, and a number of deposit-taking
companies in the past few years, the Government began to
admit that supervision over financial institutions was
inadequate. An unprecedented and drastic regulatory reform
is underway. In March 1986, the new Banking Bill was
published in Government Gazette and is expected to be
enforced in the middle of the year:
The Bill covers six main areas:
1) Giving the Banking Commissioner additional discretionary
power;
2) Demanding tighter auditing requirements;
3) Clarifying ownership requirements;
4) Installing more stringent loan restrictions;
5) Introducing new capital adequacy ratio requirements;
6) Amending the liquidity ratio requirement;
The new Bill is welcomed by the banking sector
generally and makes the average depositors feel more
comfortable about the banking system.
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Besides empowering the Government to know more about
bank activities, the proposed legislation calls for tighter
controls on excessive lending, mainly to prevent financial
institutions from over-relying on the creditworthiness of
one party, group or sector. Definite impact is expected on
the local banks, especially the small ones, as they usually
have a greater exposure to a particular sector or
associated group. It is believed that adjustment is needed
not so much in the size of loan portfolio, but rather in
the composition of loans to different parties and industry
sectors. Bankers are generally of the view that the two
years following the implementation of this reform will be
critical for small local banks to restructure their capital
base or asset composition, as well as the banking system as
a whole.
Bankers also think that the need for small local
banks to devise a long-term strategy to strengthen
themselves by taking in strong foreign partners or by
merging has become more pressing than ever. Actually, the
trend has already begun: CITIC's injection into Ka Wah
Bank, KIO's increased stake in Dao Heng Bank, Heng Sang
Bank's purchase of Wing On Bank, and Far East Bank's active
search for a strong partner are the obvious examples.
676.4 Government Assistance in the Future
From the Hang Lung takeover in 1983 onwards, 4 times
(takeover of Hong Kong Industrial Commercial Bank was
counted together with that of Overseas Trust Bank because
the former is a subsidiary of the latter) the Government
has utilized the Exchange Fund to rescue local banks from
deep trouble. More than once, Sir John Bremridge,
Financial Secretary, justified his decision by the
explanation that the actions were to protect the interest
of depositors and to save the Hongkong banking and
financial system from collapse. However, the public has
begun to wonder, "Had the Government used the Fund
wisely?" Can the Government rescue all the banks in
trouble endlessly? "Is it fair to have taxpayers sharing
the risks inherent in business activities?"
The Government has been aware of these criticisms and
somewhat changed its way of handling failing banks. In the
recent purchase of Ka Wah by CITIC and the temporary
takeover of Union Bank's management, the Hongkong
Government adopted a low key profile. It acts as a
guarantor in the former and as lender of last resort in the
latter. Although the Exchange Fund may still bear
possibility of loss, it lets these banks operate in private
hands.
As the Government collects licence fees and taxes
from banks, it is understood that it has the responsibility
to maintain the health of the industry. The best medicine
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to cure is not to rescue in times of deepening troubles,
but to supervise effectively to prevent crisis from
occurring. The new Banking Regulations may serve to
enhance quality of supervision on banks. Small local banks
have already prepared to make adjustments in order to
comply with the new requirements. The emerging trend
indicates that future incidence of government takeover will
be reduced to a minimum.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
The repercussions from the OTB failure are much more
serious and far-reaching than generally perceived. The
drift of deposits from the smaller local banks to the
bigger ones, which accelerated in the wake of the crisis,
has not yet ceased. In the interbank market, foreign banks
remain reluctant to lend to small local banks whose
shareholders or business profile are judged to be linked
with family interests in Southeast Asian countries. This
starts a process of polarization, in which the weaker banks
decline while their stronger brothers grow more powerful.
When the new Banking Act is implemented in June this
year, those banks with fundamental weaknesses in their
management and loan portfolio would be under great
pressure. Only those which are able to make appropriate
adjustments to upgrade their quality in terms of capital
and management will survive and better equip themselves for
the future.
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The restructuring process is necessary for sound
local banking system, as Richard Farrant, advisor to the
Commissioner of Banking, said,
An efficient banking system requires periodic
invigoration by new entrants, and periodic cleansing
by the removal of failures."
With 143 licensed banks and over 300 deposit-taking
companies, the domestic market is more than saturated.
Fierce competition is expected in all types of banking
services. Almost all financial institutions in Hongkong
are putting more emphasis on marketing their products to
customers. The major banks, namely, Hongkong Bank, Bank of
China group and a few American banks, have adopted a more
aggressive approach to soliciting business in order to
capture a bigger market share. In order to survive,
smaller local banks must be innovative and identify its own
niche.
With credit weak, liquidity high and competition
keen, bankers agree that 1986 will be another difficult
year for banking operations. The industry will enter a new
era of restructuring in the face of new banking regulations
and unfavorable market situation.
70APPENDIX 1
NAME OF BANKS INCORPORATED IN HONGKONG
Banks included in the population (local banks):
abbreviation
1) The Bank of Canton, Limited BOC
2) Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong Limited
3) The Bank of East Asia, Limited BEA
4) Chekiang First Bank Limited CFB
The Commercial Bank of Hong Kong5) CBH
Dah Sing Bank, Limited DSB6)
Far East Bank Limited FEB7)
DHBDao Heng Bank Limited8)
HLBHang Lung Bank, Limited9)
HSB10) Hang Seng Bank Limited
11) The Hong Kong Chinese Bank Limited
HIC12) Hong Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank Limited
13) The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
14) Hong Nin Bank, Limited
KW15) The Ka Wah Bank, Limited
KOB16) Kwong On Bank, Limited
LCH17) Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited
OTB18) Overseas Trust Bank Limited
SCB19) Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited
SHK20) Sun Hung Kai Bank Limited
21) Tai Sang Bank, Limited
.22) Tai Yau Bank Limited
UBH23) Union Bank of Hong Kong Limited
UCB24) United Chinese Bank, Limited
WHB25) Wing Hang Bank, Limited
WLB26) Wing Lung Bank Limited
WOB27) Wing On Bank Limited
Banks excluded due to their state-controlled nature:
Chiyu Banking Corporation Limited1)
Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Limited2)
Nan Yang Commercial Bank Limited3)
Po Sang Bank Limited4)
Banks excluded due to their DTC nature:
Chan Man Cheong Finance Company1)
Lee Shing2)
Ming Tai Finance Company3)
Wayfoong Finance Company4)
The abbreviations are given as reference
for the graphs in Appendices 7 -12.
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APPENDIX 2
LOCAL BANKS WITH OVERSEAS BRANCHES
No. of Overseas Branches
as of September 1984
The Bank of Canton, Limited 4
Bank of Credit and Commerce 1
The Bank of East Asia, Limited 3
2Chekiang First Bank Limited
1Dah Sing Bank, Limited
1Hang Seng Bank Limited
139The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
2The Ka Wah Bank, Limited
1Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited
7Overseas Trust Bank Limited
3Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited
1Wing Lung Bank Limited
72
APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF FINANCIALS OF LOCAL BANKS IN 1983
(IN HK$ MILLION, Balance Total Total Deposits
Sheet Total Capital Liquid Total Borrowed Net
Bank Name Date Assets Funds Assets Loans Funds Profit
2, '1HK Shanghai Banking Corp. 12/31/83 452,384 19,586 173,228 241,611 411,280 9
Hang Seng Bank 12/31/83 49,044 2,858 28,860 17,374 45,901
Shanghai Commercial Bank 12/31/83 10,630 783 5,884 3,83E 9,827
770
Bank of East Asia 12/31/83 9,962 749 5,697 3 19 02 9,179 13
Overseas Trust Bank 06/30/83 8,312 1,589 1,330 5,134 6,550 9s
Wing Lung Bank 12/31/83 5,747 482 3,021 2,56? 5,224 114
Bank of Credit Commerce HK 12/31/83 5,360 214 1,104 214 22 3,870 3]
Ka Wah Bank 12/31/83 4,962 515 814 3,941 4,416 5S
Bank of Canton 12/31/83 4,578 828 784 3,54C 3,721 91
Liu Chong Hing Bank 12/31/83 4,140 402 909 2,762 3,712 25
Kwong On Bank 12/31/83 3,831 279 868 1,807 2,596
Chekiang First Bank 12/31/83 3,497 243 1,564 1,711 3,061
4 5
Dao Heng Bank 06/30/84 3,397 406 973 2, 064 2,966 61
Hang Lung Bank 03/31/84 3,328 480 1,538 1,413 2,848 NA
Sun Hung Kai Bank 12/31/83 2,976 520 840 1,600 2,331 15
Commercial Bank of HK 12/31/83 2,925 243 936 1,826 2,674 3C
Wing Hang Bank 12/31/83 2,562 366 784 1,613 2,136
HK Industrial Commercial Bank 06/30/84 2,435 252 928 1,387 2,167
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Wing On Bank 12/31/83 2,383 284 528 1,633 2,077 21
Union Bank of Hong Kong 12/31/83 2,269 549 1,020 1,072 1,687 38
Dah Sing Bank 12/31/83 1,692 192 553 1,040 1,479 18
Far East Bank 12/31/83 1,459 145 425 918 1,307 7
United Chinese Bank 12/31/83 965 223 224 442 736 20






SUMMARY OF FINANCIALS OF LOCAL BANKS IN 1984
Balance(IN HK$ MILLION) Total Total Deposits
Sheet Total BorrowedCapital Liquid Total Net
Bank Name Date Assets Funds Assets Loans Funds Profit
HK Shanghai Banking Corp. 12/31/84 466,705 20,863 160,151 267,434 422,403 2,591
Hang Seng Bank 12/31/84 56,208 3,253 33,687 20,470 52,638 836
Overseas Trust Bank 06/30/84 12,262 1,519 2,639 8,158 10,512 53
Shanghai Commercial Bank 12/31/84 12,209 920 7,569 3,826 11,249 177
Bank of East Asia 12/31/84 11,512 831 4,5306,471 10,636 142
Bank of Credit & Commerce HK 12/31/84 7,910 419 622 3,027 5,697 36
Wing Lung Bank 12/31/84 6,417 527 3,704 2,555 5,850 102
Bank of Canton 12/31/84 5,819 920 1,578 3,935 4,864 92
Ka Wah Bank 12/31/84 5,572 531 1,099 4,270 5,010 61
Liu Chong Hing Bank 12/31/84 4,296 411 1,554 2,233 3,863 31
Kwong On Bank 12/31/84 4,274 316 1,516 2,519 3,948 47
Chekiang First Bank 12/31/84 3,974 285 2,066 1,682 3,448 57
Hang Lung Bank 03/31/85 3,691 357 1,564 1,740 3,335 (123)
Dao Heng Bank 06/30/85 3,320 409 7 74 2,223 2,911 15
Commercial Bank of HK 12/31/84 3,247 259 1,353 1,728 2,980 24
Sun Hung Kai Bank 12/31/83 3,179 533 960 1,700 2,641 16
Wing Hang Bank 12/31/84 3,037 369 1,087 1,565 2,655 40
Union Bank of Hong Kong 12/31/84 2,730 590 987 1,543 2,136 3
Wing On Bank 12/31/84 2,599 163 673 1,708 2,407 (120)
Far East Bank 12/31/84 1,948 150 507 1,271 1,794 7
Dah Sing Bank 12/31/84 1,780 205 738 937 1,569 19
HK Industrial Commercial Bank 06/30/85 1,435 263 990(100) 1,518 (290)
United Chinese Bank 12/31/84 1,013 225 407 440 783 21
Hong Nin bank 12/31/84 892 233 197 577 655 14
HK Chinese Bank 06/30/84 811 194 227 486 611 9
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APPENDIX 5
SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL RATIOS OF LOCAL BANKS IN 1983
Balance Liq. Ass. Dep. B. Return ReturnLoans to Capital
Sheet to Dep. Dep. on onFunds to Funds to
Bank Name Date B. Funds B. Funds Loans Cap. Funds Equity Assets
12/31/83 42.1%HK Shanghai Banking Corp. 58.7% 8.1q 21.0 12.7% 0.6%
Hang Seng Bank 12/31/83 62.9% 37.9% 16.4 16.1 26.9% 1.6%
Shanghai Commercial Bank 12/31/83 59.9% 39.1% 20.4 12.6 20.3% 1.5%
Bank of East Asia 12/31/83 62.1% 42.5% 19.2q 12.3 18.6% 1.4%
Overseas Trust Bank 06/30/83 20.3% 78.4% 31.O 4.1 6.2% 1.2%
Wing Lung Bank 12/31/83 57.8% 49.1% 18.81 10.8 23.7% 2.0%
Bank of Credit Commerce HK 12/31/83 28.5% 62.6% 8.8q 18.1 14.5% 0.6%
Ka Wah Bank 12/31/83 18.4% 89.2% 13.1 8.6 11.5% 1.2%
Bank of Canton 12/31/83 21.1% 95.1% 23.4q 4.5 11.0% 2.0%
Liu Chong Hing Bank 12/31/83 24.5% 74.4% 14.61 9.2 6.2% 0.6%
Kwong On Bank 12/31/83 33.4% 69.6% 15.4 9.3 16.1% 1.2%
Chekiang First Bank 12/31/83 51.1% 55.9% 12.6 21.4% 1.5%
Dao Heng Bank 06/30/84 32.8% 69.6% 7.3 15.0% 1.8%
Hang Lung Bank 03/31/84 54.0% 49.6% 5.9 NA NA
Sun Hung Kai Bank 12/31/83 36.0% 68.6% 4.5 2.9% 0.5%
Commercial Bank of HK 12/31/83 35.0% 68.3% 11.0 12.3% 1.0%
Wing Hang Bank 12/31/83 36.7% 75.5% 5.8 13.1% 1.9%
HK Industrial Commercial Bank 06/30/84 42.8% 64.0% 8.6 10.7% 1.1%
Wing On Bank 12/31/83 25.4% 78.6% 7.3 7.4% 0.9%
Union Bank of Hong Kong 12/31/83 60.5% 63.5% 3.1 6.9% 1.7%
Dah Sing Bank 12/31/83 37.4% 70.3% 7.7 9.4% 1.1%
Far East Bank 12/31/83 32.5% 70.2% 9.0 4.8% 0.5%
United Chinese Bank 12/31/83 30.4% 60.1%
14.2
3.3 9.0% 2.1%
Hong Nin bank 12/31/83 46.0% 72.5% 49.2% 2.8 13.2% 3.4%
HK Chinese Bank 06/30/84 37.0% 79.5% 39.9% 3.1 4.6% 1.1%
Tai Yau Bank 12/31/83 87.1% 66.3% 91.5% 1.6 1.9% 0.7%














SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL RATIOS OF LOCAL BANKS IN 1984
ReturnDep. B. ReturnCapitalLiq. Ass. Loans toBalance
ononFunds toDep. Funds toto Dep.Sheet
AssetsEquityLoans Cap. FundsB. FundsB. FundsDateBank Name
0.6%12.4%7.8% 20.263.3%12/31/84 37.9%HK Shanghai Banking Corp.
1.5%25.7%15.9% 16.238.9%64.0%Hang Seng Bank 12/31/84
0.4%6.9 3.5%25.1% 18.6%Overseas Trust Bank 06/30/84 77.6%
19.2% 1.4%24.0% 12.267.3% 34.0%Shanghai Commercial Bank 12/31/84
1.2%42.6% 18.3% 17.1%Bank of East Asia 12/31/84 60.8% 12.8
8.6%Bank of Credit Commerce HK 12/31/84 53.1% 13.8% 13.6 0.5%10.9%
Wing Lung Bank 43.7%12/31/84 20.6% 11.1 19.4% 1.6%63.3%
Bank of Canton 12/31/84 80.9% 23.4% 5.3 10.0% 1.6%32.4%
Ka Wah Bank 12/31/84 21.9% 85.2% 12.4% 9.4 11.5% 1.1%
Liu Cheong Hing Bank 40.2%12/31/84 18.4% 7.5%57.8% 9.4 0.7%
Kwong On Bank 12/31/84 63.8%38.4% 12.5% 12.5 14.9% 1.1%
Chekiang First Bank 12/31/84 48.8%59.9% 16.9% 12.1 20.0% 1.4%
Hang Lung Bank 03/31/85 46.9% 52.2% 20.5% 9.3 NA NA
Dao Heng Bank 06/30/85 26.6% 76.3% 18.4% 7.1 3.7% 0.5%
Commercial Bank of HK 12/31/84 45.4% 58.0% 15.0% 11.5 9.3% 0.7%
Sun Hung Kai Bank 12/31/83 36.3% 64.4% 31.4% 5.0 2.9% 0.5%
Wing Hang Bank 12/31/84 40.9% 58.9% 23.6% 7.2 10.8% 1.3%
Union Bank of Hong Kong 12/31/84 46.2% 72.2% 38.2% 3.6 0.5% 0.1%
Wing On Bank 12/31/84 28.0% 71.0% 9.5% 14.8 NA NA
Far East Bank 12/31/84 28.3% 70.8% 11.8% 12.0 4.7% 0.4%
Dah Sing Bank 12/31/84 47.0% 59.7% 21.9% 7.7 9.3% 1.1%
HK Industrial Commercial Bank 06/30/85 17.3% 65.2% NA NA NA NA
United Chinese Bank 12/31/84 52.0% 56.2% 51.1% 3.5 9.3% 2.1%
Hong Nin bank 12/31/84 30.1% 88.1% 40.4% 2.8 6.0% 1.6%
'7a c0,HK Chinese Bank 06/30/84 37.2% 39.9% 3.1 4.6% 1.1%
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THE DAO HENG BANK LIMITED - OWNERSHIP
HONG LEONG COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD
Holding company of the Hong Leong
Malaysia Group controlled under
the Chief Executive and chairman,
Quek Leng-chan
100%




20% (42%)60% (44%)20% (14%)
HONG LEONG COMPANY LIMITED
10C100%
I
DAO HENG BANK LIMITEDHONG LEONG ENTERPRISES LIMITED
The percentage in bracket indicates the shareholdings of
each party after the new rights issue of Hong Leong
Company Limited in February 1986.
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APPENDIX 14
THE KA WAH BANK LIMITED - OWNERSHIP
Shareholders Percentage Holding
C.S. Low Investment Limited 40.5%
Ka Wah Bank Nominee Limited 9.8%
Asean Nominee Limited 9.6%
Security Nominee Limited 3.0%
BOT Finance Limited 2.9%
2.6%Amidjoji Santosa









Study on Local Banks Performance 1983. The Hongkong,
Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Periodicals
Annual Reports 1984 of those banks named in Appendix 1,
"Banking Bill." Hong Kong Government Gazette,
March 7, 1986.
CCB Chief Denies Ka Wak Probe Rumours." South China
Morning Post, January 24, 1986.
"Chiu Tipped to Sell Far East Bank Stake." South China
Morning Post, January 10, 1986.
"CITIC's Top Brass Due for Ka Wah Talks. South China
Morning Post, January 28, 1986.
"CMSN May Lift Bank Stake. South China Morning Post,
September 3, 1985.
"Directors Back Bank Takeover. South China Morning Post,
March 29, 1986.
"Ka Wah Bank Moves to Bolster Confidence with New
Investors. Asian Wall Street Journal,
December 3, 1985.
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"Ka Wah Rescue Risks Millions in Colony Funds. Asian Wall
Street Journal, January 27, 1986.
Kuwaits to Strengthen Dao Heng. South China Morning
Post, February 22, 1986.
Reminding Banks of the Risk Factor. South China Morning
Post, January 15, 1986.
Shrugging off Shackles of Failure. Hongkong Review '86
South China Morning Post Supplement, p. 10.
Timely Comment on Local Banks' Exposure. South China
Morning Post, December 13, 1985.
Tough Year Ahead for Local Banks. South China Morning
Post, December 27, 1985.
Union Bank Looking for Strong Partners. South China
Morning Post, March 29, 1986.
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Interviews
Chan, Jackson. Branch Manager, Far East Bank Limited
Interview, March 10, 1986
Yao, Margaret. Assistant Vice President, The First
National Bank of CHicago HongKong Branch.
Interview, March 6, 1986
Anonymous. General Manager of a local Bank
Interview, April 3, 1986.


